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Abstract 
What makes or breaks the decision for an MNC to enter an emerging market beyond incentives 
for profit-maximization? What role exists for public-private partnerships as a mechanism for 
value capture in agricultural biotechnology investments into uncertain markets? The objective of 
the paper is to provide the necessary theoretical framework by which future research may 
empirically assess the discounted value and probability of R&D investments into the African 
agricultural biotechnology sector. A partnership model lies at the foundation for creating 
marketing channels between industries with high fixed costs and high social utility value.  
Stimulating intellectual and scientific investments in agricultural biotechnology are contingent 
on prioritization of public policy, wherein optimal investment strategy into developing markets 
becomes a balance between providing adequate incentives for investment without compensating 
technological dissemination to smallholders. A strong regulatory environment not only ensures 
market power for the private industry and but forces change in the general expectations from and 
attitude towards the hybrid seed and agriculture innovation. It is, additionally, imperative to 
create a linkage between the private sector and the smallholder. Not only are multinationals 
currently the gatekeepers of intellectual capacity for agricultural biotechnology research, but also 
possess capacity to enter the market and provide products en masses. The lack of immediate 
profit incentives may be balanced by public sector partnerships that might cushion risks and 
eventually expand market opportunities for the smallholder.  
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 Introduction: The Modern Seed Industry and Globalization 
 This paper was prompted by the question, “what is the influence of foreign direct 
investments in the seed industry in emerging countries?” Organization of the private seed sector 
has been characterized by firm consolidation and a shift away from purely agrochemical research 
into a world of high risk ventures in seed genomics. The implications for the structure of the 
industry challenged the central assumption in the questions stated above. That is, the central 
question was not so much a characterization of FDI in the seed sector, but rather which 
development strategies can by-pass obstacles of incomplete markets while stimulating 
economic growth? Effective public policy has been touted as the best method of stimulating 
foreign investments in high cost, high risk projects in areas in need of agricultural R&D.  
Research on the agricultural seed industry in developing countries is vast and has focused 
on the effects of strategic pricing behavior on competitive structures as a result of monopolistic 
and oligopolistic tendencies of the seed biotech sector and, access to seeds by farmers through 
market mechanisms as a result of market changes. Generally, these studies have centered on how 
the factors influence product, process and institutional innovation (Speilman, 2003). Product 
research investigates improvements in cultivar varieties and productivity enhancements as a 
result of genetic improvements; process research accounts for cultivar methodologies, from plant 
breeding and selection through to genetic engineering. 
Research on institutional innovation focuses on the social, economic and political 
relationship between the private and public sectors, agriculturalists and rural/urban consumer and 
will be the focus of this essay. The scope of research in this field has accounted for allocation 
mechanisms of R&D investments between public agents and the farmer or co-op and has 
followed the lifecycle of product development: addressing innovation channels, postulating on 
avenues for market introduction, acceptance, market growth and, finally, how to deal with 
obsolescence of a technology or process. 
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 What has yet to be determined in agricultural development is how to best address 
“institutional innovation” in the presence of market failures. For the sake of example, let’s 
consider a small-scale South African farmer in a village in Kwazulu-Natal. For him to simply 
participate in local markets, he needs to contend with a mode and method of transportation from 
his farm to the local market since interstate roadways have yet to be developed to the extent of 
connected the vast majority of scatter, rural villages to major towns. He also needs to address 
savings to buy seeds and invest in marketing his product, a stable and healthy supply of labor and 
weather. Idealistically biotechnology has endless potential for small-scale farmers to address 
only some of the issues. However, questions of how the farmer that would best benefit from this 
technology can afford to buy GMO seeds or maintain communications with extension specialists 
is still being investigated.  
The research presented in this essay will address the following research question: 
 What public policy measures can best take advantage of the innovations in biotechnology 
to spur agricultural development in low-income countries, given the high risk, high cost and low-
returns of these projects? 
Innovations in effective irrigation, crop protection and yield have traditionally been at the 
forefront of economic development policy. Although most of the industrial world relies less on 
the agricultural sector as carrying the burden of leading and being a proxy for economy-wide 
health, agriculture is the most important economic sector in most of the developing world. 
Productivity gains have been stalled from regional-specific diseases, environmental factors and 
ineffective techniques. Biotechnology has played a role in ameliorating some of the issues faced 
by the smallholder by creating solutions for many of these problems through gene manipulation 
and seed development.  
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 The technology undoubtedly holds promising solutions to benefit agriculture based 
economies. However, many countries have been hesitant in promoting research into biotech 
foods and crops for fear of loosing important external markets and general lack of information on 
the long-term health and environmental implications from genetic engineering.  Biosafety 
policies are harmonized with the viewpoint that biotechnology will improve the economic base 
of the exporting country as well as encourage improved resource use (Herity, 2003).  American 
and Canadian producers face less aversion to GMOs due to commercial opportunities to internal 
markets and environmental benefits that reduce production costs. In contrast, early in the 21st 
century, the European Union had in place a moratorium on importing any genetically modified 
products. From a strictly economic perspective, the production gains in North America by the 
use of biotechnology has the potential for flooding the EU market. As such, the Nuffield Council 
is perceived as a trade barrier rather than an ethical protest. African countries that begin to use 
crop biotechnology are in jeopardy of losing many EU consumers (BFTW, 2002). As a result of 
market threats from adopting biotechnology, there are many commercially and food security 
driven countries that are averse to adopting GMO technology. Zambia is an example of a country 
searching for food security and income generation opportunities yet will not adopt biotech 
policies in fear of losing the EU market.  As a country frequented by droughts, floods and breaks 
in the supply chain due to weak infrastructure, Zambian farmers are restricted to certified maize 
and some vegetable seed varieties and tend to rely on farm-saved seed. Improved seed varieties 
and complementary inputs remain artificially high due to bureaucratic misconceptions on returns 
from improved seed varieties, limiting both production and sales of improves seed varieties 
(Muliokela, 2004). Agricultural productivity and household food security in Zambia is limited to 
improving seed production, as opposed to increasing cultivated land area, as well as improving 
national seed distribution system. In the case of Zambia, seed certification programs have been 
developed to protect farmer varieties and lower transaction costs within the market. Also, there 
has been general government support and investment to initial seed sector development 
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 (Muliokela, 2004). Ultimately, the promise for improved productivity and general stability 
overshadows ethical doubts of the science.  
 Contrary to a public-sector driven research sector in the past, today the private sector 
hold the best resources to devote to research and development (R&D). With changes to the 
industrial structure of the sector, larger firms have an opportunity to invest in risky projects, such 
as regional specific crop diseases. At the same time, larger firms are driven by shareholder 
expectations and thus, evaluate projects based on profit margins which necessarily excludes 
many agricultural genomic research aimed at developing countries. Smaller seed research 
facilities are often inadequate to address genomic research questions. It is currently difficult to 
attract necessary investments into the commercial research and development sector for regional-
specific diseases due to perceived and actual low market returns for these investments, 
distribution challenges in countries with poor market infrastructure and lack of awareness for 
agricultural research oriented in developing countries. Parallel importing and compulsory 
licensing have also created disincentives for future investments. Finally, the high fixed costs of 
conducting research often precludes the ability to offer these technologies at low-cost for the 
smallholder. In the end, the farmer who will end up using the seeds are cultivating to serve local 
food needs. Hence, the issue becomes one of creating affordable access to hybrid seeds without 
compensating incentives (i.e. returns on investment) to invest in such opportunities.                
 The essay attempts to address to question of how to improve incentives to invest in seed 
genomic research in African countries by synthesizing information from related sectors, such as 
pharmaceutical and information technology and other industries similar to the organization 
structure of the biotechnology industry.  The findings reiterate that it is insufficient to simply 
reiterate the role of the public and private sector in disseminating productivity-enhancing 
technology and poverty reducing strategies. Rather, the gap between potential for investments 
and probability for returns on investment are a function of two elements: an appropriate 
economic model and public-private partnerships modeled after successful ventures in the AIDS 
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 and Tuberculosis research sectors. I propose that research be invested in the potential for real 
options theory as a method for better articulating the extent to which investments will be of value 
to its stakeholders and affected by technical uncertainty, regulatory uncertainty and scientific 
uncertainty. In an industry characterized by high-costs, support for venture capital markets 
through public-private partnerships is unequivocally the best public policy instrument because it 
bridges institutions to address transaction costs and risks. The essay introduces the next step: a 
best practice model based on the work of the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development.  
In Section 2, the state of the seed biotech industry will be characterized with respect to its 
private and public sector structure in 2005 and public policy framework. The current industrial 
structure will be described and put into context with the Schumpeterian model of innovations 
(Section 2.1). In light of a consolidated industry, the need for effective patent laws will be 
discussed as a tool for harnessing research for application to problems in developing countries 
(Section 2.2). The role of public sector will be presented (Section 2.3) and then partnership 
potential between the public-private will be explored (Section 2.4). The best practice model will 
be discussed in Section 3 and the economic model will be presented in Section 4 and applied in 
an example to investments in the Kenyan seed industry (Section 4.1). Section 5 concludes with 
policy recommendations and future research goals. 
 
Section 2: Review of Literature 
Section 2.1: Industrial Organization of the Agricultural Biotechnology Sector 
 Previous literature in this field has reiterated the ability of the private seed industry to 
fostering well-developed market structures in countries where multinational corporations 
(MNCs) decide to invest and it’s role in advocating and initiating the process of developing a 
system of intellectual property in the country’s public policy system. The trend towards 
consolidation (discussed in greater detail below) has in some respects “synergized” research 
capabilities with local start-ups and public firms, has allowed for economies of scale and scope 
to override fixed costs associated with the R&D costs idiosyncratic with the biotech industry. 
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 The primary source of genetically modified (GM) crops today is the private sector (Sithole-
Niang, 2004). Thus, many economists have advocated a pure private sector approach to 
accelerating technological growth in the developing world because the private sector offers the 
best opportunities for technology transfers and commercialization (Barton (2004), Martin, S and 
Scott, J (2000)). The private sector can import technologies with greater efficiency due to 
differing goals. As opposed to pure research goals, there are factors such as profitability and 
cost-efficiency that improve the selection process of various investment opportunities (Wagner, 
1999). Currently, the international seed industry has been the largest investor of seed research in 
commodity-export oriented countries, such as Brazil and Argentina (Appendix: Table 1). Most 
field trails of new biotechnologies are conducted by private MNCs (Pray, 1999).  
 The pubic policy emphasis on promoting private sector growth in the seed industry is a 
departure from the rhetoric that drove success in Southeast Asia during The Green Revolution. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, introduction of improved and modern variety of seeds was possible 
with a well integrated institutional system. Appropriate resource management techniques and 
introducing complementary inputs, dramatically increased agricultural productivity and 
stimulated economic growth within a span of 20 years (World Bank, 2003). The public sector 
influence resulted in a public goods nature of agricultural R&D. Institutions were able to manage 
costs and risks of long-term projects in areas with high degrees of uncertainty and allow of wider 
dissemination of knowledge through a vertically integrated system via an enabling public policy 
regime (Byerlee et al, 2002).          
 A decade ago, the commercial seed industry was highly concentrated in industrialized 
countries, with a calculated global seed market of $50 billion (US). The Erosion, Technology 
and Concentration (ETC) Group estimates that the top 10 seed industries in 2003 controls 
$23,000 millions worth of the commercial seed market and accounts for 31% of commercial seed 
sales (ETC, 2003). Most MNC concentration is evident in the largest food crops, such as maize 
and soybean. In 2003, the global market value of GM crops is estimated to be $4.50 to $4.75 
billion ($4.0 billion in 2002). This value for 2003 represents 15% of the $31 billion global crop 
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 protection market, and 13% of the $30 billion global commercial seed market. However, for 
maize alone, four companies control over three-quarters of the commercial seed market (ETC, 
2003). For 2005, the global value of the GM crop market is projected to be at least $5 million, 
with over 67.7 million acres devoted exclusively to transgenic crops in 18 countries (Davis, 
2004).   
 As the empirical evidence suggests, the biotechnology market is dominated by few firms 
with significant market power. Mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances are typically 
between large and established firms and, technology start-up companies (Appendix: Table 2). 
According to the Economic Research Service of the USDA, Monsanto best exemplified the trend 
towards consolidation and led the fundamental shift in the industry focus from agrochemicals 
and fertilizers into genetics and life sciences. Between 1996 and 1998, Monsanto acquired a 
biotech company (Calgene) and numerous seed companies (Asgrow, Corn States Hybrid, 
DeKalb Genetics, Holden’s Foundation Seed, the Plant Breeding Institute Cambridge, Sementes 
Agroceres and Cargill’s foreign seed business). Are biotech investments adequate methods of 
stimulating industrial development? The US Federal Trade Commission assesses industry 
competitiveness in terms of impact on innovative capacity (Giannakas et al., 2001).  Indeed 
forward and backward integration not only by-pass transaction costs of entering risky markets 
and initiating field tests, but leads to commercialization of plant biotechnology (Bijman, 2001). 
Brennan et al. (2001) found that MNC concentration in the US biotech sector was 
complementary for corn- and cotton-related patents, but substitutes for soybean. It must be noted 
that multinational seed companies are able to improve overall efficiency and competitive 
advantage of the sector. Vertical integration with smaller firms still in phase 1 of a research 
project, however do not generate profits because they are unable to attain economies of scale and 
scope with respect to most aspects of the product pipeline (i.e. plant breeding, variety registration 
and marketing). 
 Market structure is invariably a determining factor to the success of a firm in an R&D 
race, in addition to public sector R&D and intellectual property rights. Phillips (1971) suggested 
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 that the market structure of R&D influences the market downstream. The gains realized by 
smaller, local seed companies in developing regions are largely afforded in terms of increased 
research capacity and ability to avoid the fixed costs of the R&D process through market 
imperfections, such as knowledge spillovers (Alex et al., 2002).    
 The late Schumpeter model from Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1975) will serve 
as the theoretical basis from which the current agricultural biotechnology seed sector will be 
evaluated. Unlike Schumpeter’s earlier theory, where technological advances are characterized 
by constant entry and regeneration by innovative firms causing displacements of “out-dated” 
firms, his later model introduced the concept of barriers to entry. For example, as mentioned 
earlier, the agrobiotech industry is characterized by high fixed costs and potentially high profits 
for patent-holders of a specific technology. The uncertainty of successful product development is 
balanced by the potential of certain market power and corresponding existence of economics of 
scale from this “winner takes all”-patent-based specialization in innovative processes. Larger 
firms with greater technological resources and market power enjoyed positions of static power. 
These firms would then use this market advantage to finance risky, large-scale R&D activity and 
leave society better off (Martin S. and Scott, J, 2000). However, the game is not lost for those 
who do not finish first-as ‘creative destruction’ implies: the sole holder of a technology is bound 
to be imitated or superceded by another-better- innovation. Research on Schumpeter’s model of 
technological change in non-competitive market conditions is exhaustive and appropriate from 
which to view the current high-tech agricultural market because it is an industry where risk is 
inherent in the research, development and commercialization process.  
 Supporting Schumpeterian views on innovation, Brennan et al (2001) show that market 
concentration in the US biotechnology industry could increase appropriability, that is the 
opportunity to bring a product from concept to market. Success could increase R&D intensity in 
the forms of economies of scale and scope. For example, Baker (1998) suggests that 
monopolization in Aspen skiing resorts or Kodak actually encouraged fringe innovation in some 
industries by increasing the expected payoff to such innovation without reducing the incentives 
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 for dominant firms to innovate. Hayenga (1998) stresses that there is currently insufficient 
evidence of price setting by mature firms in oligopolistic seed industries. As a result of 
concentrating their research and marketing resources, the end-user gains from high productivity 
and efficiency gains (Thayer, 2002).         
 Martin (1998) suggests that product-market competition will reduce expected profits 
before and after innovation but, reduces pre-innovation profit relatively more and this increases 
private incentives to invest in innovation. As the concentration of firms active in innovative 
activities increases, competitive pressure will reduce incentives to innovate in the industry, as a 
whole. Specifically, risk aversion may increase with increased concentration, and crowd out the 
smaller entrepreneurs, who are potential risk takers and sources of innovation. Ahn (2002) also 
summarizes the effects of market power as an issue between the expectations of ex post market 
power as an incentive to invest and ex ante market power as a means of reducing uncertainty 
associated with excessive rivalry. There does exist a “two-tiered” structure by which a dynamic 
relationship exists; the yet to be profitable start-up that pioneer research of biotech processes 
pertinent to regional agricultural issues and the multinational which is typically a late-comer into 
the market. Although static competition might appear almost non-existent, the expectations of 
short-run market power is a necessary condition for dynamic competition. Industry concentration 
serves as an incentive for expansion by spreading the sunk costs of basic research (Breenan et al, 
2001).              
 Ultimately, the limited empirical research does not resolve any questions regarding the 
relationship between concentration and R&D activity (Oehmke, 2001). A strict reliance on 
market structures can result in underinvestment in innovative processes due to limited 
appropriability from the market as a whole, limited knowledge spillovers or monopolization of 
government infrastructure: each of these elements overrides the potential for consumer surplus as 
a result of market power (Martin, S and Scott, J, 2000).  However, profits from market powers 
can also provide firms with leverage to innovate despite inefficient markets. This is the most 
powerful argument for private sector expansion in agrobiotech industries. The inability for local 
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 seed companies to gain access to complementary inputs such as the presence of credit 
institutions, distribution mechanisms (marketing programs) and opportunities for bureaucratic 
collaborations with the private sector is largely driven by the presence of monopolistic  industries 
that capture rents, overestimating managerial effort and leading to greater market inefficiencies 
(ETC, 2003). Madhok (2002) suggests that the extent of influence of innovations to incumbent 
firms in the agrobiotech industry is influenced by home country embedded-ness of technology 
creation and absorptive capacity for commercialization. The general positive spillovers from 
technology transfers may be adversely affected by higher market prices upon entry of MNCs 
through strategic alliances with strong local firms. As the trend towards privatization in the seed 
industry continues to be predominated by large multinational seed industries, the exclusive rights 
to the market leads directly to a strong market position. Naturally, value placed on technology as 
a result of exclusively further drives up the market value, despite regulatory cushions or 
consumer uncertainty.          
 With new models of market structure and competition, the case for strict market power is 
no longer sufficient. Similar to Schumpeter’s earliest model of innovation, new entrants have the 
potential to aggressively experiment with new technology because they are not overburdened by 
corporate goals and large management structures. The smaller, goal-oriented firm may actually 
be a driving force for innovations and also forced to innovate themselves (Ahn, 2002). Garcia 
and Velasco, 2002 studied the European biotechnology industry and introduced the dyadic 
notion of competition and cooperation (“co-opetition”), where strategy is a function of industrial 
relationships rather than structure. Specifically, co-opetition occurs when 2 firms form a strategic 
alliance and trust towards a common goal, yet compete in other aspects. This notion extends to 
the shifting political mind-frame of the 21st century ag-biotech venture capitalist. 
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 Competitive pressure will always be the most reliable free-market mechanism of checks 
and balances, with the power to stimulate innovative activity, consumer surplus, and firms are 
more apt to increasing productive efficiencies so as to secure rents that better reflect marginal 
gains in productivity (Ahn, 2002). Competition is conducive to Darwinian innovation and growth 
or a ‘neck-and-neck effect’, forcing firms to speed up adoption of new technologies and innovate 
to survive. In high-tech industries in emerging economies, product market competition is more 
common, since it is characterized by as a market of substitutability between new and old 
production methods.             
 
Section 2.2: Why Plant Property Rights have come to matter 
 Grossman et al. (1991) argues that biotech companies with vested interests in agricultural 
inputs and trade enter the seed industry to diversify their activities. It is the existence of 
intellectual property laws that guarantee exclusive rights over technologies, and as such remains 
the source of barriers to entry and decisive factor of taking risks in a potential market: market 
power becomes a reality with a system of property laws. Intellectual property rights in the form 
of patents have greatly influenced MNC strategies on investing and controlling dissemination of 
proprietary knowledge. Plant technology is, naturally, a biotech MNC’s main commercial asset 
and is used to guarantee a continuous stream of income after years of R&D. It is the prospect for 
recuperating the start-up costs from licensing patents which stimulates the financial investment 
in new technologies and attracts new investors.  
 Fifteen years ago, Vitamin A deficiency afflicted nearly 400 million of the world’s 
population, of which a quarter were children. Without Vitamin A, children develop partial to 
complete blindness, respiratory problems and diarrhea (Sommer, 1990). For the poor, the 
majority of caloric requirements are from rice grains, a food without beta-carotene, the precursor 
to Vitamin A. So, Swiss scientists introduced 3 genes: two from daffodils and one from a 
bacterium that produces beta-carotene (giving the rice it’s golden color) with the ultimate goal of 
transferring the genetic materials to local varieties of rice in developing countries (Khush, 2004).   
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  Unfortunately, golden rice not only used 70 different patented materials, but these rights 
belonged to 32 different entities (countries and universities). How can golden rice reach the 
poorest farmers free of restriction? In the end, the inventors were able to circumvent the IPR 
issues by issuing the technology under the general principle of “technology for humanitarian 
purposes” sponsored by Syngenta. Humanitarian use mandated that Golden Rice be made 
available to resource poor farmers who make less than US$10,000 per years. Humanitarian 
license terms allowed the inventors to secure rights from several companies, without forsaking 
commercial rights and possibilities. To date, the Philippines, India, China, Vietnam and 
Indonesia have secured licenses to Golden Rice. Although this case is an illustration of one of 
the first successful public-private sector partnership, it also shows that tapping into the genetic 
potential of a crop variety afflicted with disease and productivity hurdles is not a simple matter 
of R&D development and marketing. The use of proprietary technologies might cause costly 
inventions to never reach the end-user either because of costs of ownership or limitations to 
commercialization. Golden Rice was a rare case of socially-conscious inventors and effective 
legal resources to avoid patent hassles after the fact. It reflects that if an invention is sure to 
benefit a large mass of people around the world, duty might (and in this case, did) supercede 
pure profit-motives. In most cases, this framework will not apply, especially when research has 
not reached the development stage due to costs impediments or without a clear profit margin as a 
result of appropriation.          
 The hybrid seed industry’s market security is directly related to changes in intellectual 
property rights (Barton, 2004). Hybrid seeds are valued for commercial gains from significantly 
higher yields and, proprietary incentives are a necessary mechanism encouraging innovation and 
R&D. For most hybrid seeds, however, there is an added barrier of protection as many seeds do 
not breed true-to-type offspring. In cases where ‘biological’ protection is non-existent, Plant 
Breeder’s Rights have been adopted in most countries under the provision of the international 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) as a uniform system for variety 
protection and quality control in industrialized nations. Without UPOV laws, a breeding parent 
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 can be a genetically altered variety (i.e. a plant where a specific gene has been introduced 
artificially). A competitor can legitimately transfer this gene by cross breeding and market the 
resultant variety as his own, with the gene originally discovered in the breeding parent. Without 
laws that account for such occurrences and protecting the transformed gene, a breeder would be 
less likely to discover genes, create trangenic seed varieties and introduce them into the market 
(Barton, 2004).  
 Once novel and useful inventions of processes are patented, the ability to capitalize on 
patents is highly dependent on mechanism of patent and intellectual property protection 
(Nuffield Council, 2004). Without divulging into patent law, holding a patent gives the owner 
full control over who may obtain a license for use of the technology for a given period of time. 
UPOV is largely viewed as the most effective framework for legislative positioning. Aside from 
the obligations established under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) agreement of the WTO, underdeveloped frameworks threatens cut-offs from biotech 
investment opportunities and access to proprietary knowledge that fail to go beyond the 
provisions guaranteed by UPOV. UPOV serves only as a necessary guideline for clarifications 
and limitations on patent law legislation and is certainly not sufficient. 
  UPOV 1978 initially outlined 3 criteria for varietals protection afforded to plant 
breeders: 1. Distinctiveness1 2. Uniformity and, 3. Stability 2. For example, consider a transgenic 
insect resistant variety. Ownership at stake includes: rights for the germplasm, 2 patents for the 
selectable marker gene, 2 patents for the trait to be incorporated, 1 patent for the transformation 
technology, and 2 patents for the gene expression technology (Bijman, 2001). A patent holder 
may then license the rights to a germplasm with no obligation to license the corresponding 
technologies it owns. The classic case illustrating the potential insufficiencies of UPOV is that of 
                                                 
 1By distinctness, the UPOV means a variety of plant which is ‘clearly distinguishable from other 
varieties whose existence is a matter of common knowledge’ 
 2Relevant characteristics of protected plant variety remain unchanged either for a specified period 
or after repeated propagations or cycles of propagations’ 
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 Agracetus3, the first to obtain patent protection for the genetic engineering of cotton plants and 
transgenic soybeans (Bijman, 2001). The broad nature of the patent protected both the transgenic 
plant and the technology, implying that Agracetus would have exclusive rights to all transgenic 
soybeans and cotton plants, regardless of technological methods and thus, tremendous 
commercial power.          
 The current version of UPOV viz. UPOV 1991 added ‘new’ to the description, to 
complete the description of plant patents to be “new” and “distinct”. The newest amendments 
also broadened coverage of patent laws to cover plant varieties of all taxa. UPOV 1991 gives an 
option to national governments to prevent farmers from the privilege of retaining or re-using 
seeds for self cultivation. In other words, the breeder of a cosmetically bred variety would have 
to buy genetic dependency rights from the derived variety prior to commercializing the derived 
version.           
 IPR policy plays a crucial role in agricultural investments as a signal for a market where 
risk taking behavior will payoff. Low discount public funds for plant breeding has induced 
countries like India to develop policies modeled after UPOV , based on the implicit assumption 
that private funds for R&D in plant breeding will ‘crowd in.’     
 Further, technology licensing agreements complements the development of an 
oligopolistic, yet globalized marketplace. Licensing allows a firm to maintain market power and 
control over their innovative processes while minimizing the potential start-up costs of market 
development (Bessey et al., 2002). As an intermediate form of knowledge transfer, licensing 
ultimately has the benefit of affiliation with established local partners and less investment risk 
(Krattiger, 2002). Not only are intellectual property rights used as a mechanism of market 
protection but, it increases exporter liability to infringe on foreign IPR. Barton (2004) suggests 
that with effective laws, IPR can be beneficial in creating location-based trademarks in 
developing countries, where geographic indicators can be used as product identification and 
                                                 
 3Agracetus is now owned by Monsanto 
 
 
15
 differentiation signaling quality and trust. IPR regimes play a key role in influencing the 
evolution of innovations (discussed in detail in Section 4). Arguably, patent laws that protect the 
seed investor from gene discovery, transformation and any transformed plants with the patented 
gene are needed. Such laws also facilitate commercialization of varieties developed in the public 
sector.              
  Barton (2004) however, suggests that IPR has differential effects on research between 
ornamental, horticultural and field crop varieties. That is, for crops such as wheat where hybrids 
are generally not used, IPR creates very little inventive for additional R&D as opposed to maize 
where IPR is a necessary form of protection (Barton, 2004). In many ways complying to 
protection laws are cost prohibitive for local seed firms. Tripp (2003) claims that seed sector 
regulation is not a prerequisite for seed system development because regulation can actually be 
perceived by farmers and smallholders as a hindrance to production development. The cost of 
obtaining regulatory clearance for crops, such as Bt maize, that are registered in the main export 
markets range between $7 to 15 million dollars (De Greef, 2004).      
 Gravel et al (2004) considers a similar industry, the electricity power grid investment, 
and suggests that for irreversable investment decisions lengthy and costly regulatory review 
processes increases market uncertainty-regulators should strive towards predictable, fair and 
short processes. Currently, many sub-Saharan countries insist on food crop certification process 
which remains a cost prohibitive for smaller seed companies and a time cost to larger firms. De 
Greef (2004) expands upon the prohibitive nature of international regulatory services for the 
public goods sector. Most regulatory compliance work for large-scale, commercial agrobiotech 
projects are in-house for companies with the legal and administrative capacity.   
 The most viable options for accessing proprietary technologies include unilaterally 
accessing technologies, purchasing it and material transfer and, licensing agreements (Khush, 
2002). The first of the three options merely suggests that it would be legal for the public sector to 
copy a technology without seeking permission from the owner if the patent for the technology 
has not been lodged in a country where it is used or exported to a country where the technology 
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 is protected. This option is most seen in countries with fragile national agricultural research 
systems and ill-defined regulatory frameworks.       
 The purchasing option is most viable for situations where knowhow exists in the private 
sector of a technology which would be of social benefit, but market uncertainty impedes private 
sector development of the technology. The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) which 
purchased the rights to Bt gene owned by a Japanese firm, Planttech, made the rights to the gene 
publicly available subject to royalty costs. Similar scenarios have also played out in Latin 
American national agricultural research centers. Khush (2002) suggests that a contract to 
participate in a agricultural development process in exchange for retaining ownership of the 
product with the private sector via a competitive bidding option would be a viable strategy in 
situations when development of products that would otherwise not go into product development 
due lack of foreseeable profit-motives could materialize.    
 Currently, material transfer and licensing agreements (MTA) are favored due to minimal 
upfront costs and lowered risks because negotiation for the use of the product occurs after the 
value of the product is fully known. However, MTAs are usually limited to use for the research 
phase, leaving legalities and development for commercial use to a later stage. Also, since the 
success rate of the product is known, the higher expectations on returns to investment lead to 
higher costs. The prospects of gaining first-mover advantages with such technology is an 
especially  fruitful strategy in economies that have yet to be introduced to innovative products. 
MNCs successfully capture and secure profits since farmers must return year after year to 
procure new seeds from the seed marketer to sustain his new found high yield output.  
 Hence, the extent of and conditions for seed demand are factors to consider from the 
production side; improved technologies are far superior in yield capacity than traditional 
landraces, especially for hybrid seeds capable of increased yield under limited availability of 
water and certain management practices (Maunder, 2000). Although hybrid seeds have been 
widely adopted by small-scale farmers in markets where price controls have kept seed-to-grain 
prices low, farmers are far more willing to forgo controlled pricing and willing to pay as much as 
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 double for seed from an MNC with the reputation and assurance for quality seeds. Hence, one 
might argue that intellectual property rights with provisions for material transfer and licensing 
agreements will not only favor of the private industry as a necessary way to  encourage 
innovation and growth, but a valued requirement if effective varieties are to reach the African, 
Asian or Latin American farmer.        
 Enforcing and adjusting intellectual property rights policy will not encourage additional 
private sector investment in these countries, as intended, unless there is harmonization between 
biosafety and patent law expectations between countries sharing similar agricultural markets. To 
gain an understanding of the future of biotechnology dissemination in the seed industry in 
developing countries, it is imperative to realize the reasons for stronger, progressive and enabling 
IPR policy. Expectations on biosafety are especially important in the agricultural development 
context because of the fragility of the raw materials supply chain and prospects of expanding into 
European and American markets (Nuffield Council, 2004)4.   Biosafety regulation complements 
producer-side quality assurances by instilling confidence in newer technologies and creating a 
proxy for the social value of certain technologies (Sithole-Niang et al., 2004). Clearly, the 
priority for regulatory and trade policy with respect to stimulating biotech investments in 
developing nations is the ability to improve seed demand, concurrently with the increase effort in 
the production side (Tripp, 2003). Indeed a regulatory environment is a mechanism for accessing 
proprietary technologies by the public sector from the private sector, but legal measures also 
include legal and business options for varietal protection of hybrid crops developed by individual 
farmers and co-ops. For the poorest nations, the prospect of patent ownership is worthwhile as an 
investment catalyst only if there is a substantial commercial market for the hybrid variety. While 
a rigid regulatory framework increases the perceived costs and anticipated time to future 
investment projects by increasing time to realize investment projects, the most important 
                                                 
 4The Green Industry Biotechnology Platform is a trade organization promoting these 
concepts of “ethical capital” 
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 implication of redefining the proper balance of regulatory systems is the guarantee of returns to 
investment via a compliant market.         
 Tripp et al (2000) suggest that quality controls should be shifted ‘downstream’ by not 
only advocating consumer awareness, but also improving capabilities for ensuring quality control 
in the production-side. The current form of regulatory process and approval in the seed industry 
(in the form of variety registration, seed certification and quality control) ensure varietal safety 
and physical quality. Nonhybrid crops, except for vegetables, have had less success as products 
for opportunity in overseas markets (Maunder, 2000). In the case of spring wheat from Dekalb, 
although over 50% of the Argetinian market accepted the product it was not as profitable as 
marketing smaller grains in Europe. As a result, a much less risky approach to seed introduction 
has been by way of exports and licensing arrangements with established indigenous businesses. 
For example, Zimbabwe is currently transitioning from a public seed sector to a semi-private 
seed co-op which must start forming technical collaborations with U.S., South African, Zambian 
and Kenyan seed companies (Maunder, 2000).        
  Tripp (2003) offers the example of Kenya’s policy for accepting Ugandan or Tanzanian 
varieties that have been tested and approved in their country of origin. Of course this idea of 
policy harmonization is not a peril to seed industry development in Sub-Saharan Africa. While 
the US does not have a mandatory variety registration or seed certification process, the European 
Union requires all varieties be certified and registered. However, the major difference between 
the apparent divergence of policy scenarios between these industrialized and developing centers 
is the attitude on existence and promotion of voluntary private certification agencies (Tripp, 
2003). Although the regulatory framework for varietal introduction via the private sector is 
shifting to a more enabling environment, the ability to register and release new varieties of seeds 
is still subject to a tougher approval process compared to the United States (Tripp, 2003). The 
incentive structure exists in the form of marketing reputation of the seed firm and quality of 
production. Sithole-Niang et al (2004) report that the number of approved GM crops in 
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 developing countries is largely limited to insect-protected cotton due to ease of approval, since 
cotton is not a food crop and thus not subjected to food safety concern at home and for export.  
 
Section 2.3: The Modern Seed Industry and the Public Sector   
 Currently, low purchasing power in a prospective economy in conjunction with a highly 
oligopolistic market sustains barriers to competition for local seed research firms and encourages 
higher price of seeds. New technologies have tended to displace those farmers that are unable to 
afford the agronomic changes needed to meet the demands of the growing food industry in most 
developing nations. Indeed one may argue that this simply creates a market where only the most 
efficient survive, the disparity amongst those who ‘survive’ in the market is not necessarily a 
function of true superiority in productivity, but rather access to extension resources. MNCs 
introduce better quality technologies that previously had not existed within the economy, 
however without competition and balance in the market, there are less incentives to encourage 
better technologies and research (Barton, 2004). The public sector does maintain the level of 
competition, participation of the public sector exists in a limited capacity, with majority of 
funding and execution highly dependant on the public sector (Falconi, 1999).   
 Although most plant genome research occurs in the private sector, there is little focus on 
agricultural production needs in the developing world (Barton, 2004). While cereal crops, such 
as maize, wheat and rice are traded both in domestic and international markets, sorghum, barley 
and millet are cultivated on marginal agro-ecological land and subject of significantly less R&D 
expenditure from both foreign public and private sectors. The majority of varietals come from 
local public institutions, such as universities and most commonly national seed and agriculture 
research centers.         
 Traditionally farmers produced seeds by saving and selecting seeds for planting from the 
best in their harvest (Grooseman et al., 1991). Until the 1960s, the seed industry consisted of 
small and medium-scale firms and cooperatives serving a local and at most a national market 
(Grossman et al., 1991). The modern seed industry has been responsible for agricultural 
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 modernization by introducing new hybrids and plant breed and seed production techniques. 
Hybrid seed technology ensures greater uniformity and higher yield although at a much higher 
cost than non-hybrid varieties (Groosman et al, 1991). Easy access to genetically altered seeds to 
the African farmer remain ineffective in facilitating dissemination of biotechnology to rural 
markets due to the high cost of the seeds. In 2002, of the 130 million acres of land devoted to 
GM crops, 0.2% was in Africa (Bread for the world, 2002). None of the GMO products in 2002 
specifically addressed the idiosyncrasies of the African agricultural market (Appendix: Table 3). 
 Seed ventures by the private sector in maize, sorghum, sunflowers and wheat, as 
examples, have been successful in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Thailand. Not surprisingly, the 
beneficial impact of biotechnologies have been on crops of high economic importance Crops 
associated with a lower or not existent comparative returns on the world market, yet important in 
developing regions, have limited the potential for attracting research-oriented activities into 
Africa. Beyond that, the basic technologies introduced to the market tend to focus little on 
regionally important food grains and improving agronomic traits such as yield and insect and 
disease resistance (Brennen, 1999).         
 In Falconi’s (1999) study of the biotechnology industry in Mexico, Kenya, Indonesia and 
Zimbabwe, each country’s private sector research used mainly less advanced and thus, less 
costly, techniques which are closer to the market than more expensive research techniques 
because of the degree of risk associated with more advanced research. For the sake of 
compensating R&D costs, the most progressive research has concentrated on quality concerns of 
the developed market. Inadequate and low levels of research have resulted in lack of high 
yielding varieties and disease resistant varieties pertinent to smallholder needs. Although the 
private sector is may seem irrelevant to meeting the needs of the smallholder, there are 
opportunities for idealistic market exchanges; for example offering GM seeds at marginal cost 
pricing while recouping research expense by selling to large scale farmers at market prices 
(Barton, 2004).  
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  The public sector, on the other hand, finances around 90% of total agricultural research in 
developing countries (Appendix: Table 4) (Pray and Deininger-Umali, 1998). Research 
capabilities vary between national agricultural research systems (NARS). Type 1 NARS posses 
the capacity in molecular biology to develop new products for specific needs (India, China, 
Mexico and Brazil) whereas Type 2 NARS has the capacity to borrow and apply molecular tools 
(Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Colombia, Argentina and Kenya). Most of Africa falls into 
Type 3 NARS, with simply capacity to borrow and apply technologies. It is in the third case 
where national research centers have no regulatory framework in place to even import and test 
transgenic products (Khush, 2002).  
 Maunder (2000) well-articulated that the limitations faced by private sector development 
can work only with partnerships with the public sector. Falconi (1999) contends that the public 
sector was always essential as a counterbalance to the private industry in the presence of 
inefficient agricultural market structures. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) replaced approximately 60% of the rice and wheat for high yielding dwarf 
varieties during the Green Revolution. It was particularly financial investments into seed 
development in Asian and Latin American countries, rather than importing seeds developed in 
developed countries, that was perceived as the most beneficial form of public investment during 
the Green Revolution. Since the Green Revolution, these national agricultural investments 
centers have grown at tremendous rates in the emerging economies such as Brazil and China. 
These institutions provide an international network of field experts, conduits between farmers 
and technology by addressing all biotic and abiotic production constraints and guiding programs 
that maximize public benefits from technological innovations in agriculture (Barton, 2004). 
Varieties developed in the public sector can also be introduced to the market at competitive 
prices compared to the private sector varieties. Public sector assets also include a wide range of 
evaluation networks, expertise in breeding, familiarity with local growing conditions and access 
to seed delivery systems. However, Wheeler and Berkley (2001) identified transparency and 
public scrutiny at the public sector level as the deciding factor in a successful partnership. 
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 Section 2.4: Public-Private Partnerships in Biotechnology 
 Without the private sector, progress made by the public sector in promoting cutting-edge 
research is drastically slowed. Although public-private relationships are highly desirable from 
the perspective of social welfare, there is little incentive for private sector participation. Tripp 
(2003) explains that the public institutional structure of the current seed industry in Sub-Saharan 
Africa makes is even more difficult to improve incentives for private sector risk-adversity due to 
lack of competition, acquisition of domestic firms and, complexity of research goals and 
strategies for the public African agricultural sector (Barton, 2004). Although Brennan et al. 
(2001) suggest that public sector R&D has a relatively quick impact on private sector R&D 
intensity, without the necessary data on the size, structure and content of the public sector at a 
national level, there is very little to support an informed policy decision to stimulate private 
investments (Falconi, 1999).  
 As public sector research intends to address smallholder farmer issues by adapting 
technologies developed by the seed industry, it finds itself downstream from private sector 
research (Barton, 2004). Falconi (1999) found that only a few public-sector research 
organizations use advanced biotechnology techniques and most local start-ups which can 
potentially enter into strategic alliances with an MNC are only in the first states of developing 
research capacity. As such, only the largest local seed companies can exploit research and 
technological capabilities. 
 A partnership between biotechnology firms and research centers in the creation of new 
information and technologies typically works as follows:  Research centers collaborate as 
partners with larger biotechnology companies that are able to best realize the technical and 
commercial potential of research findings, i.e. provide risk funding for commercially attractive 
activities that are commercially attractive as identified by companies and academics. The 
partnerships expect collaborating companies will ultimately manufacture and distribute the final 
product. The basic incentive to accomplish this is by granting the company exclusive patent 
rights to the product while research centers provide access to the developing world markets. 
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  Rarely are crop diseases with minimal commercial return are targeted. Collaborations 
between the private and public sectors usually include either private firms simply donating 
technology, institutions building upon existing biotech tools or genuine information and 
knowledge sharing. What are the “best practice” models of partnership currently in place where 
the public sector can maximize their societal goals without compensating the private sector’s 
responsibilities of living up to shareholder expectations on profit margins given investments into 
product development.   Since the mid-1990s several biotechnology products were introduced to 
the developing countries either through patent agreements facilitated through partnerships 
between the private and public sector. The following are examples of such collaborations: 
 Example 1: Pioneer Hi-Bred and the Agricultural Genetic Engineering Institute (AGERI) 
in Egypt worked together to develop a novel Bt strain that was introduced into locally adapted 
varieties of corn to develop insect resistance in those varieties (Khush, 2002). The project itself 
was funded by the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Program (ABSP) of the USAID at 
Cornell University. This project is a good characterization of the extent of investments necessary 
for high-tech development. AGERI scientists had to be trained in order to properly characterize 
the gene and subsequent transformations. The case of unique in that Pioneer was granted access 
to evaluate novel Bt proteins and genes patented by AGERI, i.e. ownership and 
commercialization of transformed maize belonged to the public sector and was made available to 
the private sector for use in the markets they served.     
 Example 2: In another example where ABSP was the supporting mechanism, Syngenta 
(ICI seeds during the time of the agreement) and the Central Research Institute for Food Crops 
(CRIFC) in Indonesia collaborated to develop tropical maize varieties resistant to Asian corn 
borer. Similar to the AGERI case, Indonesian scientists had to be trained on using transformation 
technologies. This example is used to illustrate the challenges encountered by private-public 
collaborations due lack of knowledge on IPR. In this case, the differences in development and 
protection provided between national laws and lack of legal management capacity in the public 
sector served as a major impediment to negotiating technology transfer agreements. Currently, 
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 NARS type 2 and 3 lack the knowledge necessary to properly negotiate such agreements with the 
public and private sector. 
 Example 3: In a project between Monsanto and scientists at the University of Hawaii to 
develop ringspot resistance in papayas, an extensive network throughout Southeast Asia was not 
only developed for the sake of R&D, but included specialists to address the impact of the 
research on income generation, food production, and nutrition impacts for resource poor farmers. 
Moreover, the research scientists were trained beyond their areas of specialty to include 
biosafety, food safety and IPR management. In many respects this model was successful; field 
trails were started in Malaysia and Thailand. In this case, it was the regulatory process in many 
of these countries that slowed the development process. Infrastructure problems within the 
government included inadequate staffing and knowledge of existing staff in bureaucratic roles to 
address biotechnology work (Esscaler, 2003).  
 Example 4: The best example from Africa is the case of virus resistant sweet potato in 
Kenya. The feathery mottle virus (SPFMV) has afflicted production yields throughout Africa, 
with up to 80% yield loss in some parts. In 1999, the ISAAA brokered a partnership for the 
development for SPFMV resistant sweet potato though biotechnology. The Kenya Agricultural 
Research Institute (KARI) and Monsanto, along with research support from ABSP and the Mid-
American Consortium formed a partnership where Monsanto actually donated a royalty free 
license to virus resistance technology for application to sweet potatoes. Training and internships 
provided for Kenyan research scientists and the establishment of biosafety structures, IPR 
protection and technology transfer mechanisms have all helped the GM sweet potato reach 
station trails. Moreover, this project fostered the first field test of a transgenic crop in any Eastern 
and Central African country.  
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 Section 3: In Search of a Model Beyond Agriculture 
 Krattiger (2002) describes the decision process of an MNC entering international markets 
as two-tiered. A company must choose between the option of exporting goods into a country or 
producing goods in the target country. Then, the company must decide between the option of 
establishing foreign affiliates or some form of local production through joint venture or 
establishing a firm without a strategic alliance.  It is most likely a risk-averse MNC chooses a 
licensing agreement through a strategic alliance with a well-established local research entity that 
has enough research capacities to carry out and build upon patented techniques for local 
adaptation. Once this decision is made, however, the firm goes through a sequential investment 
process. 
 Once pursuing the decision to market a variety in a partnership scenario, the firm 
automatically subjects itself to incurring upfront costs during the regulatory process. Once they 
enter into the regulatory process, the probability of attaining approval is a matter of the perceived 
social welfare benefits by the regulator. This is a function of global perceptions of the biotech 
project, but also regulations and policy that affect the long term flow of net benefits (Gravel, 
2004). The longer it takes for the approval process to take place, the greater degree of uncertainty 
for the firm, as it becomes more costly to implement the project.  Hence, this first step is 
ultimately affected by 1. Completion time for regulatory proceedings 2. Sunk costs to enter 
regulatory process. The best practice partnership addresses the latter of the concerns by holding 
the public institution accountable for the costs of product and market development in the country 
of interest. Once a firm attains regulatory approval, it invests with known sunk start-up cost. The 
uncertainty in this scenario comes with the randomness of project benefits and uncertainty with 
the irreversibility of the investment process (Gravel, 2004).   
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  Of the various examples of public-private partnership, the “best practice” tends to pool 
the skills and efforts of partner organizations around specific projects with a common objective 
amongst members of the partnership, employs funding from a philanthropic organization and 
involves a for-profit partner. Alternatively, partnerships can allow the private company to select 
amongst a list of pre-selected projects to reduce risks of investments and add value. 
 Fundamental to these partnerships is creating arrangements where capacity to understand 
and maneuver intellectual property laws are paramount. Apart from identifying the feasibility of 
a project and funding sources, the successful partnerships maintain a tight-knit and effective 
management team that coordinates project selection and ensures overhead costs are minimized 
without forsaking flexible and responsive organization (Wheeler, C. and Berkley, S, 2001).
 The best example of this is the current structure of the Global Alliance for TB Drug 
Development. It’s mission and focus is “to accelerate discovery and/or development of cost-
effective new TB drugs that will: shorten the duration of TB treatment or otherwise simplify its 
completion, improve the treatment of latent TB infections and, be effective against multi drug-
resistant TB strains.” The decisive feature of this organization is that they consider patenting and 
licensing rights a strategic element of project deals. Through past mistakes, ignoring patent law 
had led to devastating costs and in many cases circumvented by evoking humanitarian goals. 
However, the new direction involves using patent law to provide a greater incentive for private 
sector cooperation by selecting profitable projects and encouraging motives for sustainable 
production.            
 How can this be accomplished when targeting low-income markets? Companies are 
compensated for the expected reduced profits in these markets by being allowed to profit from 
more extensive sales of the product in more profitable markets or allowing for application of the 
patented technology to other products. These options allow organizations to leverage investments 
by negotiating to keep profit margins as low as possible. Global Alliance outlines various options 
for leveraging IPRs for low profits. The similarities between pharmaceutical markets and 
biotechnology markets include the high cost of the research and development phase, regional 
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 specific focus of diseases (crop and human), difficulty of low cost distribution systems and 
lastly, the need for patent laws to protect the end product. The differences include end-use. 
Whereas a drug is administered, a hybrid crop or GM product may require training in cultivation 
methods and techniques. Further, the time between introduction and market adaptation is longer: 
the process of field testing to specific environments, biosafety and other regulatory processes 
greatly add to the time between investments and realizing returns on investments. Bar-Ilan and 
Strange (1996) refer to model of irreversible investments applicable to projects with a “gestation 
period.” Multinationals require a minimum time frame of 8-10 years to develop adapted cultivars 
to a new market as well as prepare for long-term trial period of success (Maunder, 2000).  Lastly, 
the implications of patent laws are more complex in terms of breeding and marketing in various 
countries, as we’ve seen in Section 2.2. These complexities do not preclude the “best practice” 
relationship, it actually addresses these issues. If a public institution is able use it’s own 
resources for field testing and trial development as well as incorporate it’s vast networks for 
regional testing, in exchange for private sector development and ownership of the final product, 
the private-public relationship leaves desirability for future investments by addressing some of 
the risks of the testing process. 
 
Conclusions: Policy Implications for African Seed Development  
 Agro-industrialization has created added potential for biotech agricultural investments, 
domestic and foreign, through changing relationships in the food processing and retail sectors by 
vertical integration. Seed technology progress has lead to food fortification, such as 
incorporating essential vitamins and micro-nutrients in cereals and has created pest and disease 
resistant plants that are capable of withstanding harsh environments.  Over the last decade, the 
United States enjoyed tripled investments in agricultural and food R&D, with private sector 
agricultural spending outpacing that of the public sector. A trend towards vertical integration has 
resulted between the farmer and the retailer in order to meet increased demands of a middle class 
with higher purchasing power and ensuring higher quality controls throughout the supply chain. 
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  In the case of Zambia visited in the introduction to this paper,  Zambia currently lacks 
strong public-private partnerships to aid certified seed farmers, suffers from burdensome 
government involvement in seed trade regulations and lastly, lack of effective managerial and 
financial expertise in domestic seed companies to facilitate competitive improvements. In 
addition to institutional deficiencies, seed security is threatened by current Zambian regulations 
limiting seed donation programs in fear of farmers cultivating plants of unknown varieties that 
will threaten local genomic land races or counteract with natural pests and, destroy current seed 
distribution networks (Muliokela, 2004). Hence, the greatest potential impact from investing in 
the biotech seed industry will occur in economies with the absorptive capacity in terms of 
infrastructure, regulatory scheme and institutional support.    
 Kenya provides the perfect example of an emerging economy with an intermediate level 
of biotechnology, orienting towards a stable seed distribution network which is supporting the 
shift away from full dependency on the public sector for agri-technology development (Falconi, 
1999). Kenya is in the process of establishing a fully functional biosafety regulatory system. The 
Kenya Agricultural Research institute (KARI) is the leading public institution in agricultural 
biotechnology and provides the only case in the continental region with field testing success of a 
hybrid variety. Furthermore, Kenya enjoys a strong public sector for biotech development by 
hosting the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), which transfers technology 
between the public and private sectors to the resource poor farmers. Kenya also houses the 
Bioscience Center for East and Central Africa and Kenya Agricultural Research Institute which 
is in collaboration with Monsanto and Syngenta Foundation5. It is the collaboration between 
researchers, extensionists, farmers and policymakers that allows these foundations to prioritize 
research projects and general development of agricultural biotechnology. In 1996 Kenya formed 
a biosafety committee and prior to that the Industrial Property Act and Plant Varieties Act was 
implemented, in an effort to encourage private sector participation (Falconi, 1999). According to 
                                                 
 5Biotechnology in Kenya is benefits from a special program on Biotechnology  
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 Falconi (1999) there is only one public research organization in the advanced stage of 
biotech development, whereas the other institutions are in the first stages. Odame et al. 
(2003) suggests that despite substantial interests by the Kenyan public sector of modern 
agricultural technologies, the slow progress is evidenced by low-tech applications. 
 It is recommended that the best way to stimulate foreign investments into African 
agricultural research is to concentrate on the ability for countries such as Kenya or South 
Africa to accelerate partnerships with private seed research companies with a specific 
focus on projects with interregional impact. Public policy should thus facilitate 
collaborations by: 
1. Strengthening intellectual property rights laws that not only protect research 
conducted within the country, but provisions that protect seeds distribution and 
marketing as well as clear penalties for violations.  
2. Increase administrative resources in regulation and biosafety departments. It is an 
absolute necessity to decrease the time to wait for a seed company wanting to 
begin field testing of important crops. The capacity of government departments 
not only comes in terms of increased staff sizes, but also knowledge of national 
and international laws 
3. Ease research networks between countries by harmonization of biosafety and 
intellectual property laws. 
These policy suggestions hinge on the ability for a private company’s perception for 
success. Intellectual property laws ensure investments are protected, but it also addresses 
the issue of market structure.  
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 Appendix 1: Tables 
  
Company  Research Area (year) Contract Value
AgrEvo (GeneLogic) Disease Resistance (1998) $ 45 million 
Bayer (Arqule) Library Screening (1999) $30 million 
American Cyanamid (Hyseq) Genomics (1999) $60 million 
  
Table 1: World Research Agreements in Agrobiotechnology, 1996-2000 (Echeverria 
et al, 2001) 
 
Seed Company (country of origin) 2002 Global Seed Sales (US millions) 
1. Du Pont/ Pioneer (US) $2,000 
2. Monsanto/Pharmacia (US) $1,600 
3. Syngenta (Switzerland) $937 
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 4. Seminis (US) $453 
5. Advanta (Netherlands) $435 
6. Group Limagrain (Vilmorin Clause) (France) $433 
7. KWS AG (Germany) $391 
8. Sakata (Japan) $376 
9. Delta & Pine Land (US) $258 
10. Bayer Crop Science (Germany) $250 
Table 2: Top 10 Seed Companies Active in Research and Development (ETC, 2003)  
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 Crop Susbsistence Commercial Market 
Millet √  
Barley √  
Cereal Crops: cultivated in smaller 
quantities on marginal agro-ecological 
land for both human and animal 
consumption 
Sorghum √  Cereal Crop: Cultivated in industrial 
countries as hybrids 
Rice √ √ 
Wheat √ √ 
Cereal Crops: Traded on domestic and 
international markets, human 
consumption, animal feed 
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 Maize √ 
 
  
√ Cereal Crop: Cultivated in industrial 
countries as hybrids; subjected to most 
private sector R&D expenditure 
 
Cotton  √ 
Soybean  √ 
Commercial Crop: Extensively traded 
and subjected to major private and 
public R&D expenditures. Both are 
OPVs6
 
Table 3: A Brief Outline of Cultivation Status of Major African Crops 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 6Open-Pollinated varieties (OPVs) breed true when cross or self-pollinated, i.e. 
retain the expression of their traits. As a result, when cultivated in isolation farmers can 
cultivate new varieties by seed-saving 
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 Country Area of Research 
Kenya  Production of disease free plants and micropropagation of pyrethrum, bananas, 
potatoes, strawberries, sweet potato, citrus, sugar cane 
Micropropagation of ornamentals (carnation, alstromeria, gerbera, anthurium, 
leopard orchids) and forest trees 
In vitro selection for salt tolerance in finger millet 
Transformation of tobacco, tomato and beans 
Transformation of sweet potato with proteinase inhibitor gene 
Transformation of sweet potato with Feathery Mottle Virus, Coat protein gene 
(Monsanto, ISAAA5, USAID6, ABSP7, KARI8) 
Tissue culture regeneration of papaya 
In vitro long term storage of potato and sweet potato 
Marker assisted selection in maize for drought tolerance 
A nd insect resistance 
Well-established MIRCEN providing microbial biofertilizers in the East 
African region 
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 South Africa Genetic engineering 
- Cereals: maize, wheat, barley, sorghum, millet, soybean, lupins, sunflowers, 
sugarcane 
- Vegetables and ornamentals: potato, tomato, cucurbits, ornamental bulbs, 
cassava and sweet potato 
- Fruits: apricot, strawberry, peach, apple, table grapes, banana 
 Molecular marker applications 
- Diagnostics for pathogen detection 
- Cultivar identification – potatoes, sweet potato, ornamentals, cereals, 
cassava 
- Seed-lot purity testing – cereals 
- Marker assisted selection in maize, tomato 
- Markers for disease resistance in wheat, forestry crops 
 Tissue culture 
- Production of disease free plants – potato, sweet potato, cassava, dry 
beans, banana, ornamental bulbs 
- Micropropagation of potato, ornamental bulbs, rose rootstocks 
 
Table 4: Research Trends in Selected African Countries (Brink et al, 2001) 
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 Appendix 2: Economic Model       
 As the structure and depth of influence of the private sector has expanded to 
support growth in international markets, intellectual property rights and liberalization of 
the seed markets has begun to account for the specific implications to private industry 
involvement and it’s relevance to the role of local seed companies and public sector 
institutions. Biotechnology investment decisions are a function of market knowledge size, 
size of economies in production and recipient country regulations. These elements are 
also sources of uncertainty and risk for any private sector seed venture. In the end, the 
ability for private sector development at the local and MNC level is a function of the 
perceived returns on investment and on shareholder equity. The source of uncertainty can 
be generalized into two realms: regulatory and technical. Regulatory uncertainty is a 
result of national and regional policy related to intellectual property and patent rights, 
seed demand, research infrastructure, as well as the international economic stability. 
Technical uncertainty is a function of level and ability of vertical integration which 
affects the ease of research and development of a product and is largely influenced by the 
presence of other seed companies and NARS (Brennan et al (2001).  
 Using the best practice scenario developed in Section 3, let us assume an MNC 
enters into a licensing relationship with a research center in the market of interest 
(Krattiger, 2002). Of course this is not a risk-less venture, despite having developed the 
initial research, there are weaknesses associated with possible opportunistic behavior 
among parties, information asymmetry, general uncertainty on performance of 
technology in the new market (Bessey et al., 2002). The general risks associated with the 
limitations on the scope of the patent, possibility of inventing around it and the difficulty 
of regulation is a function of the general strength of the regulatory framework within the 
biotech industry (Bessey et al, 2002). The uncertainty hurdle is further compounded by 
the interest of time: time to wait out the regulatory process and time to build and 
development. Once time and uncertainty are overcome, a product may reach the market 
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 and a firm can realize certain revenues. Until then, however the decision to invest is 
hastened under uncertainty, where firm would prefer to enter immediately in order to 
avoid the future opportunity costs (Bar-Ilan and Stange, 1996).  
 Lavoie and Sheldon (2003) suggests real options as an adequate framework to 
assess the comparative advantage and dynamic trade relations between biotech 
investment decisions in the US and Europe. Given the option to invest in the US and EU, 
Lavoie and Sheldon (2003) found the incentives for private firms to exercise the option to 
invest in the US was a result of the presence of higher comparative per-period rates of 
investment and less regulatory uncertainty despite rising R&D costs.  
 The option to invest is thus subject to various forms of regulatory uncertainty. 
Gravel et al. (2004) use a simple real options framework to analyze the process of a 
regulatory review for an investment option in the Ontario electricity market. Similar to a 
biotech decision, these investments are lagged, irreversible, whose value varies randomly, 
but the firm must, nonetheless, incur upfront costs to launch the regulatory process 
(Gravel et al., 2003). Specifically, the probability of success is a direct function of the 
uncertainty of the regulatory process since it contributes to the delay the decision to 
initiate the regulatory process and invest in the project.   
 Following from Bar-Ilan and Stange (1996) and Gravel (2004), the option to start 
a project can be perceived in terms of the expected net value of the project V(X), itself. 
The decision to start the project then becomes feasible if the expected net value is ‘high 
enough’, i.e. can at the very least recoup the sunk costs of investment at both stages as 
outlined above. The expectations from the project are subject to the uncertainty of risks 
associated with regulatory approval and costs of the process. The probability of receiving 
approval, q(x)   can then be accounted for by a standard normal CDF, ∈( , )0 1 φ ϖ( , )m  , 
where for a given realization of x, the probability of a positive outcome is a function of 2 
parameters (Gravel, 2004).  
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o, the probability of receiving regulatory approval must equal the expected net value of 
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7It is assumed that the flow of new project benefits follow a geometric Brownian 
otion and is a lognormal density function:  
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GWhere the net present value during the regulatory process is contingent on 
he costs of the regulatory process and the probability of regulatory approval, q(x) 
, and a function of the cumulative probability of success from the investment 
project, 
∈( , )0 1
φP  , and time for the regulatory process to be complete, TR whose risk is adjusted 
y interest rate, . Given this, we can say that there exists a value, , for which values 
elow it,  would be optimal for a firm to wait before beginning the regulatory process and 
bove would indicate it is beneficial to begin the regulatory process (Gravel, 2004). 
xR
*
R R
Let us assume that . It is appropriate to assume that the approval period for 
the project would last for a limited time, T , for which period project uncertainty is 
ubject to changes to the overall socio-economic conditions beyond control of the firm. 
lso, let T* be the time at which the firm begins the regulatory process. In the 
eterministic case, the flow of net project benefits is known and the regulatory process 
ill definitely success, q(x)=1. Unlike the stochastic problem, the firm knows how X 
hanges and it can immediately make all necessary decisions. Since X moves in GBM, 
and  is the growth rate of project benefits, the firm’s maximization 
objective function is: 
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here the numerator the log function is the annualized project cost and the denominator 
s the value of the flow of project benefits once the projected is completed in the 
eterministic case. Hence, the value of X at which the firm should decide to enter the 
egulatory process is T*, i.e. when flow of project benefits equal annualized project costs: 
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 Example of Application 
T*: Optimal Time to Begin An Investment Project & Threshold Value of Expected 
Net Benefits 
 From our solution for T*, we see that T is an increasing function of costs of 
regulatory process, costs of project, time for project and interest rates. Intuitively, as the 
perceived costs of starting and conducting a project increases, a firm would wait longer 
before starting the regulatory procedures for the investment project since it would reduce 
the present value of the project. Since the firm incurs sunk costs for both phases of the 
investment project, a higher interest rate would increase the opportunity cost of the 
project. Gravel (2004) notes that T* actually first decreases and then increases as the time 
for completing the regulatory process increases. Since a small increase in the waiting 
time for regulatory approval has negligible impact of the future discounted net benefits, it 
doesn’t affect the fact that the firm would rather act sooner rather than later. From the 
objective function we also note that T* is a decreasing function of , since as the growth 
of project benefits increase, the firm is likely to invest sooner. The threshold value of the 
expected net benefits shares similar relationship with T*.  shares similar relationship as 
optimal time.   
  increases with  and decreases with costs and time.  π *
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 Analytical Assessment: The Case of Ag-Biotech Investments In Kenya 
 Following from De Greef (2004), regulatory clearance for developers to market a 
crop already registered in the main export market is estimated to be between $7 and $15 
million. The total cost of product development will be estimated at twice this, as De 
Greef (2004) suggests that the financial burden of regulatory clearance absorbs about half 
of the total product development investments. A biosafety assessment of a GM crops is 
estimated between $0.8 to $2 million. The best practice model is assumed and for a cash 
crop, such as cotton. The cotton includes both the small scale, localized farmer and 
larger, export oriented producer.   
Consider the following parameters and range of values for a sensitivity analysis.  
α  {0.5,0.66,0.75,0.8} 
ω {0.5,1.00,1.50} 
Time for Regulatory  
approval 
{
  
1,2,3,4} 
Cost for Compliance {0.16,.7,2,4} 
Duration of Regulatory 
Approval 
{3,5,7,10,25} 
Cost for Product 
Development 
{.4,1.75,5,10} µ {.01,.02,.044} 
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  The average per year regulatory cost per crop is $0.16 million, with almost 75% 
of the research focus on crop research (Falconi, 1999 and Sithole-Niang et al, 2004). 
Once the approval process is over, the investor has a limited period of time to act. In the 
EU, if a crop has been approved for market, the applicant has 10 years to bring the 
product to market. From time of approval to expiration, developers accrue risks in the 
product development pipeline. However, as outlined earlier, given the technology’s 
market potential, and general ability to invest significant resources into facilitating 
technologies through regulatory processes, public research lags and the private industry 
remains the major source of stimulating a biotech industrial cluster (Sithole-Niang et al., 
2004).  This would then run in Matlab or similar simulation package that allows the 
derived probability functions to be programmed. 
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